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"common enterprise," the courts should require a pooling of funds as was
emphasized in Howey. 35 Where a modified reading of the Howey test
seems justified, as in the modification of the "solely" requirement to "no
managerial efforts," the modification should be read narrowly. New types
of analysis such as the "risk capital" approach should not supplant the
Howey test. Thus, when such analysis is beneficial, it must be incorporated
into the Howey formula. "' Such an approach should effectuate the policy
of limiting the scope of the Acts while still providing flexibility in those
circumstances warranting extended coverage.
Gary S. Marx
II. THE 140 SERIES RULES
Section 5 of the '33 Act prohibits the use of interstate commerce or the
mails to conduct transactions in securities unless those securities are regis-
tered' with the SEC.2 The Act also establishes classes of securities and
types of transactions that are exempt from the registration requirement of
section 5. Among the exemptions provided are exemptions for securities
issued in an intrastate offering,3 for transactions which do not involve a
public offering,' and for transactions conducted by a person other than an
'' See text accompanying notes 89-106.
14 See text accompanying notes 119-36.
Registration of securities under the '33 Act is accomplished by filing a form with the
SEC that contains the information specified in Schedule A of the Act. Securities Act of 1933
§§ 6 & 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f & g (1976). Schedule A generally requires information about the
directors and management of the company issuing securities, the character and size of the
company's business, and recent property acquisitions by the company which were not in the
ordinary course of business, in conjunction with disclosure of the interests of directors and
managers in such property acquisition. In addition, the registration statement must reveal
the pendency or existence of any legal proceedings. The statement also must indicate what
use will be made of the proceeds of the securities offering. Finally, Schedule A requires
extensive financial disclosure. The registrant must submit a balance sheet which was pre-
pared within 90 days of the filing, income and expense statements for the three years preced-
ing the filing, a summary of the company's earnings for the preceding five years, and addi-
tional historical information, including a description of the company's capital structure, for
a period of ten years preceding the filing. Additionally, these financial statements must be
certified. See Securities Act of 1933 Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
Securities Act of'1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976); see text accompanying
notes 196-211 infra.
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976); see text accompanying notes
9-106 infra.
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issuer,5 underwriter,' or dealer7 of securities.' In order to define the scope
of these exemptions the SEC enacted the 140 series rules.
A. Rule 146
Section 4(2) of the '33 Act exempts securities offerings that are not
public offerings from the registration requirement of section 5.1 Judicial
interpretation of section 4(2), however, has not created any comprehensi-
ble and uniform standard for determining whether, in a particular case,
the exemption is applicable. 10 Therefore, the SEC enacted Rule 146, which
prescribes the requirements an issuer must satisfy to qualify his offering
as a non-public offering." The Rule, however, expressly is non-exclusive,
thereby allowing offerings that fall short of Rule 146's requirements to
qualify as a non-public offering if such offering satisfies the requirements
imposed by the prevailing judicial interpretation of section 4(2).12 A recent
Fifth Circuit case expresses the requirements currently necessary to estab-
' "[Elvery person who issues or proposes to issue any security" is an issuer under the
1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1976).
1 An underwriter is "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to...
the distribution of any security. . . ." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11)
(1976).
7 The 1933 Act defines a dealer as "any person who engages either for all or part of his
time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person." Securities Act
of 1933 § 2(12), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1976).
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1976); see text accompanying notes
107-95 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976). See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
See generally text accompanying notes 14-90 infra.
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rule 146]; see SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-5487, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974).
22 Rule 146, Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977), indicates that although an
issuer must satisfy all the requirements of Rule 146 to qualify the securities offering for
exemption under the Rule, Rule 146 is non-exclusive, and transactions failing to meet the
requirements of Rule 146 may still be exempted by § 4(2). The Rule was adopted to provide
guidelines for issuers seeking a non-public offering exemption. These guidelines were neces-
sary because judicial interpretation of § 4(2) failed to establish criteria that an issuer could
follow with reasonable certainty that his securities offering would qualify as a non-public
offering. See ABA, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Position Paper, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAw.
485, 488-89 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Position Paper]. However, the Rule was not intended
to constitute a restatement of judicial interpretation under § 4(2). See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5913, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,532 at 80,172
(March 6, 1978). Portions of the Rule are more restrictive than the judicially imposed require-
ments of § 4(2), while certain provisions of the Rule are less restrictive than the requirements
of § 4(2). Id; see text accompanying notes 73-106 infra. Therefore, Rule 146 purposely was
made non-exclusive. See [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 80,172;
Position Paper, supra, at 489. Although several state blue sky authorities have enacted rules
that appear to condition the granting of a non-public offering exemption on the fulfillment
of all of the Rule 146 requirements, the ABA has asserted that the authorities' actions are
inappropriate and "overlook the sound policy reasons" for making Rule 146 non-exclusive.
Position Paper, supra, at 490.
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lish a non-public offering under section 4(2).'1
In Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp.,'4 the plaintiff had an oppor-
tunity to become a "special participant" in a partnership engaged in drill-
ing activities.'5 An offer to invest in the partnership also was extended to
seven other individuals.'" The defendant provided Doran with drilling logs
and technical maps of the drilling area and informed Doran that two of
four wells already were completed.' 7 Doran agreed to become a special
participant and was granted a partnership share in consideration for the
payment of $25,000 and the assumption of a note payable to a supply
company.' 8 Initially, Doran received favorable production reports on the
wells in operation, but these favorable reports were the product of the
defendant's deliberate overproduction of the wells.' 9 Upon discovery of this
overproduction, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
found that the defendant had violated production quotas and ordered the
wells sealed."0 When defendant resumed production and complied with
production quotas the yields were necessarily smaller. Shortly after the
resumption of operations, the note to the supply company became due and
the defendant and Doran, as cosigner of the note, defaulted. The supplier
sued on the note and recovered against Doran and defendant. 2' Doran then
instituted suit against the defendant for recission of the participation con-
tract alleging defendant's violation of section 5 of the '33 Act.22 The defen-
11 Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit
is the circuit wherein the majority of important § 4(2) cases have been decided. See, e.g.,
Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S.
944 (1976); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v.
Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Fran-
chises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
14 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
,1 Id. at 897. As a "special participant" in defendant's drilling scheme, an investor's
financial contribution was used to pay tangible drilling expenses. The contributions of
"participants" were used to pay intangible drilling expenses. Id. The importance of the
distinction between special participant and participant is that the participant can take
advantage of the tax deductions allowed for intangible drilling expenses. See id. at 897-98
n.2; I.R.C. § 263(c).
,1 545 F.2d at 898, 901. The record indicates that of the eight people offered the invest-
ment opportunity, four became "participants," Doran became a "special participant," and
three investors declined the opportunity. Id. at 898.
'1 Id. The record indicates that Doran was familiar with the oil and gas industries. He
held a degree in petroleum engineering and his interests in 26 oil and gas ventures were worth
approximately $850,000. Id. at 902. Therefore, the technical data that the defendant gave
Doran would be useful to him in making his investment decision.
" Id. at 898. Doran cosigned a note, along with officers of the defendant corporation, for
$113,643 payable to a supply company. Doran also executed an agreement to hold the defen-
dant and its officers harmless for any liability arising from the note. When this initial note
came due, the parties were able to renegotiate the debt owing to the supply company and a




2 Id. Doran also claimed that overproduction of the wells constituted a breach of con-
tract. Id. In rejecting his claim for damages resulting from the breach, the Fifth Circuit found
[Vol. XXXV
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dant contended that its offer and sale of the special participant interest to
Doran was a private placement3 under section 4(2) and thereby exempt
from section 5.24 The district court agreed, relying on the fact that Doran
was a "sophisticated investor who did not need the protection of the Secur-
ities Acts." The Fifth Circuit, noting that investor sophistication alone
is not sufficient to establish a section 4(2) exemption,26 reversed and re-
manded the district court's ruling concerning section 4(2) for a determina-
tion whether Doran had been supplied sufficient information about the
defendant and the drilling venture to make an informed investment deci-
sion.
27
The Fifth Circuit noted four factors which are relevant in determining
the availability of a section 4(2) exemption.2s An offering with a small
number of securities involved is characteristic of a private placement.
Additionally, the financial size of a private placement should be modest.
2 1
The manner of conducting the offering of securities to investors also is
that although deliberate overproduction of the wells constituted a breach of the partnership
agreement between Doran and defendant, Doran was not damaged by the breach. In fact,
the overproduction of the wells coupled with the reduced yields following resumption of
operations, see text accompanying note 20 supra, produced greater yields than if the wells
had produced continuously at the prescribed quota. 545 F.2d at 908-09.
In order for the 1933 Act even to be applicable, securities must be involved. Securities
Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976) considers ". . . fractional undivided interests
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights. . ." to be securities for the purposes of the Act. Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit considered the interest acquired by Doran in the drilling partnership to be
a security. 545 F.2d at 899 n.4; see Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). Because the defendant failed to register the
securities in compliance with § 5, see text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra, Doran brought
suit under § 12(1) of the '33 Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1976)
enables a purchaser of securities to recover the consideration paid for those securities from
the issuer if the issuer fails to register those securities in compliance with § 5 of the '33 Act.
The term "private placement" is used interchangeably with "non-public offering."
24 545 F.2d at 899.
" Id. at 898-99. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the defendant
contended that its sale of unregistered securities to a diverse group of employees came within
the § 4(2) exemption, since the sale was intra-company and therefore, not public. The Su-
preme Court refused the exemption, noting that "the applicability of [§ 4(2)] should turn
on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act." Id. at
125. Under the Court's test, private placement investors must be able "to fend for them-
selves," id., and must be distinguishable from the general investing public. Id. at 125-26; see
Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placement, 27 Bus. LAW.
1089, 1090 (1972). Because of Doran's background and investment experience, see note 17
supra, the district court considered him to be a "sophisticated investor." 545 F.2d at 898-99;
see Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963) (prior investment experience is key
to investor sophistication).
' 545 F.2d at 902; see note 33 infra.
S545 F.2d at 909.
24 Id. at 899-900. Although the Doran court considered four factors in determining
whether the § 4(2) exemption was available, the court noted that the factors are only guide-
lines to aid a court in determining whether, in a particular situation, registration of securities
is necessary for the protection of investors. Id. at 900.
2 Id.; see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 687-89 (5th
Cir. 1971).
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important. A private placement usually involves a personal contact be-
tween the issuer an offerees.3 0 Finally, the most critical factor in establish-
ing a private placement is "the number of offerees and their relationship
to each other and the issuer .... ,,3, Although an offering to a large or
small group of investors can qualify as a non-public offering, a larger group
of investors increases the likelihood that the offering is public.32 Further-
more, since the issuer has the burden of demonstrating that each offeree
is a sophisticated investor, 33 a larger number of offerees will increase this
burden and the probability that one of the offerees is not "sophisticated."
Failure to prove that all of the offerees are sophisticated investors may
preclude the existence of a private placement.
3 4
The Doran court found that Doran and each of the other seven offerees3
were sophisticated investors. 36 The court also concluded that the small
3 Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 687-89 (5th Cir. 1971);
see 545 F.2d at 900. An issuer claiming a § 4(2) exemption cannot use public advertising or
public intermediaries (investment banks or the stock exchange) to offer unregistered securi-
ties for sale. See 545 F.2d at 900; Rule 146(c) (forbidding any form of general advertising or
general solicitation).
31 545 F.2d at 900; see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
687-89 (5th Cir. 1971).
31 545 F.2d at 901; see SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971).
3 545 F.2d at 900-02. The issuer must prove that all purchasers and offerees of a particu-
lar offering are investors who can "fend for themselves." See note 25 supra.
31 545 F.2d at 902, 902 n.10. Even if an issuer can prove that each offeree is a sophisti-
cated investor, courts are reluctant to find a § 4(2) exemption on the basis of investor
sophistication alone. Instead, courts require that a sophisticated investor must be provided
with or have access to information that a registration statement filed by the issuer would
reveal. See id. at 902-03; Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
690 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); see also text accompanying notes 40-65 infra. In Doran, the
Fifth Circuit suggested that there might be situations where the court would find the § 4(2)
exemption applicable despite the absence of investor sophistication. 545 F.2d at 902 n.10. The
court noted that Rule 146 requires investors to be sophisticated and to receive or have access
to the information necessary to make an informed investment decision. See note 77 infra.
However, the court emphasized that the requirements necessary to establish a § 4(2) exemp-
tion are less restrictive than the Rule's requirements. 545 F.2d at 902 n.10; see Woolf v. S.
D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 611-12 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on on other grounds, 426 U.S.
944 (1976). Therefore, the Doran court implied that if the requisite information to make an
informed investment decision was available, a securities offering could qualify for the § 4(2)
exemption despite the fact that all offerees were not sophisticated investors. 545 F.2d at 902
n.10.
. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
3, 545 F.2d at 902. Although two kinds of investment shares were involved, special partic-
ipant and participant, the Doran court rejected the defendant's contention that because
Doran was the only investor offered a special participant's share, the defendant only had to
prove Doran's investor sophistication. Id. at 901-02. For the purpose of determining whether
the securities offering was a non-public offering the Doran court refused to distinguish be-
tween a special participant's share and a participant's share. Since these shares were offered
as part of a single investment scheme, offered at approximately the same time for similar
consideration, and offered for the same purpose, i.e. drilling wells, the court required the
[Vol. XXXV
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
number of securities, modest financial size, and personalized manner of
conducting the offering would aid the court in classifying defendant's offer-
ing as a private placement . 3 However, the district court's failure to con-
sider the relationship of the offerees to each other and to the issuer"' did
preclude a finding of a private placement. 9 The importance of considering
the relationship between offerees and the issuer results from the necessity
that offerees have information which enables them to make an informed
investment decision.
Sophisticated investors, lacking information about an issuer and his
proposed business venture, can not evaluate properly the merits of invest-
ing in that venture." Therefore, although a private placement is exempt
from section 5 of the '33 Act,"1 an issuer attempting to qualify a securities
offering as a private placement is required to provide offerees with informa-
tion or access to information which normally would be included in a regis-
tration statement.2 Providing each offeree with a document disclosing all
relevant information enables an issuer to comply with the preceding re-
quirement, but disclosure to each offeree may be expensive. As an alterna-
tive to disclosure, issuers can give offerees access to the relevant informa-
tion. In order for this access to satisfy the preceding "information" require-
ment, each offeree who is provided access must be in a position to take
advantage of his access.4 3 Thus, courts require an issuer to show that each
offeree who is provided access has an employment relationship with the
issuer," a family relationship with an employee of the issuer,15 or sufficient
economic bargaining power to obtain the needed information from the is-
suer." Since the district court failed to consider whether each offeree had
defendant to prove that all the offerees of the drilling scheme were sophisticated investors.
Id. at 901 n.9, 901-02.
Id. at 900.
31 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
545 F.2d at 903-04.
" Id. at 902-03.
" See text accompanying note 9 supra.
42 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Tax Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 143,
144 (4th Cir. 1966); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 896 (1959). See note 1 supra (information included in registration statement).
' Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 903; see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688
(5th Cir. 1971). In Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court noted that an offering of securities to
a company's employees would qualify as a private placement if the offerees were key employ-
ees who because of their position have access to the requisite information. 346 U.S. at 125-
26. In denying a private placement exemption in that case, the Court found that the class of
employees who were offered securities was not composed of executives whose position in the
company would afford them with access to the needed information. Id.
1 Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977); see note 44
supra.
"1 Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977). An offeree
who is not provided with the needed information and does not have a relationship with the
company, see text accompanying notes 44 & 45 supra, must have sufficient economic bargain-
ing power to "compel" an issuer to provide access to "appropriate files and records" and to
1978]
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been provided the information that a registration statement would disclose
or given access to sucf information, the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded Doran to the district court for a determination of that issue. 7
Doran is one of a series of cases in which courts have considered the
"disclosure or access" requirement. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,45 the
seminal case regarding the section 4(2) non-public offering exemption, the
Supreme Court noted that a sophisticated investor's ability to make an
informed investment decision depends on his access to information that a
registration statement would reveal.49 The Court's holding, however, stated
that the availability of the section 4(2) exemption "turns on the knowledge
of the offerees."50 Although the circuit courts generally have interpreted
Ralston Purina disjunctively as requiring disclosure or access, 51 the Fifth
Circuit, in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,52 appeared to adopt a require-
ment that both disclosure and access must be shown to establish a section
4(2) exemption. In Continental, the issuer complied with many of the
requirements necessary to qualify the securities offering as a non-public
offering. 3 Indeed, some of the offerees received a disclosure document from
Continental.' Nevertheless, the court rejected the issuer's claim that the
securities offering involved qualified as a non-public offering. The court
stated that:
Continental did not affirmatively prove that all offerees of its se-
curities had received both written and oral information concerning
require an issuer to answer questions concerning material information. 545 F.2d at 904. The
necessity of having an employment or family relationship, or favorable bargaining power is
recognized by Rule 146(e). Rule 146(e) notes that effective access to the information needed
to make an informed investment decision depends on an offeree's position with respect to the
issuer.
,' 545 F.2d at 903-04.
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
" Id. at 127.
Id. at 126.
" See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC
v. Tax Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1966); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959). Compare Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971) and
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 850 (1967), wherein those courts recognized access as a necessary requirement for estab-
lishing a private placement, but ignored actual disclosure as an alternate means of furnishing
investors with needed information.
52 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
The facts in Continental indicate that almost all of the investors had signed an instru-
ment noting that they had received information from the company. In addition, the testimony
of those purchasers who were called as witnesses indicated that they received information,
had access to further information, and had personal contacts with the officers of the company.
Those purchasers were sophisticated investors and knew the risks inherent in holding re-
stricted stock. Id. at 157; see generally text accompanying notes 107-95 infra (restrictions on
the sale of unregistered securities). Furthermore, the issuer was able to demonstrate that the
stock had not been purchased with the intent to resell and the stock, in fact, had not been
resold. 463 F.2d at 157; see note 73 infra (requirement of non-distributive intent).
11 463 F.2d at 157.
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Continental, that all offerees of its securities had access to any
additional information which they might have required or re-
quested, and that all offerees of its securities had personal contacts
with the officers of Continental.5
Focusing on this language, commentators suggested that Continental
abrogated the distinction between disclosure or access and, instead, re-
quired an issuer seeking a section 4(2) exemption to prove that all offerees
have "insider" status. 6 Thus, even where the issuer provided each offeree
with a comprehensive disclosure document, the section 4(2) exemption
would not be available to the issuer unless all offerees had "insider" status.
This insider requirement subsequently was rejected in Woolf v. S.D. Cohn
& Co.57 and Doran, wherein the Fifth Circuit suggested that Continental
had been interpreted improperly.Y As noted in Doran, since Continental's
disclosure statement, which failed to reveal all of the information that a
registration statement would reveal,"9 was distributed only to some offer-
ees, 10 Continental could not satisfy the disclosure requirement.6' Therefore,
it was incumbent on Continental to prove that all offerees had access to
the requisite information and a relationship with Continental that would
allow the offerees to take advantage of their access.2 Because Continental
failed to prove access," the non-public offering exemption was unavailable.
Given the preceding analysis, Doran and Woolf asserted that the
Continental court's language 4 only requires proof of the insider status of
offerees when the issuer'provides access to the information that a registra-
tion statement would reveal. 5
Id. at 160. In seeking to qualify a securities offering as a private placement, issuers
must prove that the criteria of § 4(2) are met, not only by purchasers, but by all offerees.
Id.; see Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).
"See 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES § 2.16[e] (rev.
1978); Schwartz, The Private Offering Exemption-Recent Developments, 37 Onso ST. L.J.
1, 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
57 515 F.2d 591, 610,612-13 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
" 545 F.2d at 907-08; 515 F.2d at 610, 612-13.
51 545 F.2d at 907; see text accompanying note 42 supra.
See text accompanying notes 53 & 54 supra.
6" See text accompanying note 55 supra.
12 See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
" See text accompanying note 55 supra.
" Id.
545 F.2d at 907-08; 515 F.2d at 610-13. Although the language in Continental is subject
to differing interpretations, the language of the district court for the Southern District of New
York clearly seems to adopt an "insider" requirement. In SEC v. Universal Major Indus.
Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,229 (S.D.N.Y. July 14,
1975), affl'd, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that:
mere disclosure of the same information as would be disclosed in a registration
statement to all persons offered unregistered stock would not, in the absence of
showing that the offerees had the requisite relationship with the issuer and the
ability to fend for themselves, suffice to form the basis for an exemption under
[section 4(2)]. ...
Id. at 98,211 (emphasis in original).
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Recently the SEC scrutinized Woolf and Doran. While Rule 146 was
enacted to establish guidelines for issuers seeking to qualify an offering as
a non-public offering, the Rule is expressly non-exclusive,"6 thereby allow-
ing an offering to be non-public if the requirements of section 4(2) are
met." In a recent SEC Release, the SEC criticized dicta in the Woolf and
Doran opinions which tend to ignore the distinction between Rule 146 and
The Fourth Circuit recently considered a case involving the necessity for investors to
have access to the type of information which a registration statement would reveal. In Lawler
v. Gilliam, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,277 (4th Cir. Jan. 9,
1978), Mower's trustee in bankruptcy, Lawler, brought suit against defendants alleging that
defendants violated § 5 of the '33 Act by selling unregistered securities. See text accompany-
ing notes 1 & 2 supra. Defendants Cocke and Gilliam participated with Johnson in a fraudu-
lent "pyramid scheme." Under the pretense of operating a wine importation business, John-
son and defendants sold investment notes to a small group of investors and guaranteed a high
rate of return on those notes. Additional notes were then issued to a larger group of investors
and the proceeds of that sale were used to pay off the initial investors. At each level of the
scheme a larger group of investors was included to pay off the investors at prior levels. [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,788. Mower was solicited by defendants
to invest in the scheme and he did so, investing his own funds and money obtained from other
people. When Johnson's fraud was discovered, Mower brought suit against defendants under
§ 12(1) of the '33 Act which imposes liability on any person who offers or sells unregistered
securities in violation of § 5. See note 22 supra. Mower never recovered any of the money
which he invested and was adjudged a bankrupt in a separate proceeding. Lawler, as trustee
for Mower, was substituted as plaintiff in the suit against Cocke and Gilliam. [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,789. After determining that the investment
notes were securities as defined by § 2(1) of the '33 Act, the district court held that the sale
of the notes qualified as a non-public offering under § 4(2) and registration of the securities
was not required. Id. at 92,790; see text accompanying note 9 supra. The district court found
that Mower was a sophisticated investor who had the ability to ascertain the validity of the
investment scheme. Furthermore, because Mower could have discovered the fraud through a
reasonable investigation of Johnson's scheme, defendants were not withholding any informa-
tion which was unavailable to Mower. The district court also considered Mower's investment
transactions as isolated transactions apart from Johnson's transactions with other investors.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,790. Therefore, in order to
substantiate a finding that § 4(2) was applicable, it was not necessary to prove that all of
the offerees in Johnson's scheme were sophisticated investors. See text accompanying note
33 supra.
The Fourth Circuit found § 4(2) inapplicable because Mower was not provided with or
given access to information which a registration statement would contain. Relying on SEC
v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d
893 (5th Cir. 1977); and United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.
1967), the Fourth Circuit stated that an offeree's sophistication was not a substitute for the
offeree's possession of or access to the information which a registration statement would
contain. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,791. Defendants also
attempted to substantiate their § 4(2) claim by arguing that Johnson, if required to file, would
have filed a fraudulent registration statement and Mower's receipt of the information nor-
mally disclosed by a registration statement would be worthless. The court, rejecting defen-
dants' assertions, responded that "[e]xempting an issuer of fraudulent securities from regis-
tration because he probably would provide false data places a premium on fraud and defeats
the purposes of the Act." Id. Thus, Mower was entitled to damages under § 12(1) of the '33
Act. Id. at 92,788; see note 22 supra.
" Rule 146, Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977).
" See note 12 supra.
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section 4(2).18 Although the Woolf court recognized the non-exclusive na-
ture of Rule 146, the court acknowledged that the Rule provides a "useful
frame of reference . . .in assessing the validity of [section] 4(2) exemp-
tions .. ."I' The Doran court characterized Rule 146 as a "serotine devel-
opment" and noted that issuers seeking a private placement exemption
probably will not "stray far from" the requirements of the Rule.7 0 In re-
sponse to the "creeping exclusivity" of Rule 146,11 as suggested by Woolf
and Doran, the SEC reasserted the Rule's non-exclusivity. 2 The import-
ance of this non-exclusivity evolves from the stringency of Rule 146's re-
quirements as compared with the requirements of section 4(2).
The factors used in determining whether a section 4(2) exemption is
available73 are guidelines rather than strict requirements which must be
satisfied to qualify for the exemption.74 Conversely, each requirement of
11 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5913, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,532 (March 6, 1978).
11 515 F.2d at 612; see Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv.
571, 590-91 n.51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Casey].
70 545 F.2d at 908; see note 75 infra.
7' See Marsh, Who Killed the Private Offering Exemption? A Legal Whodunit, 71 Nw.
L. REv. 470 (1976) ("tongue-in-cheek" description of the creeping exclusivity of Rule 146).
72 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5913, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) at 80,172.
" Among the factors that should be considered in determining whether § 4(2) is applica-
ble are offeree sophistication, the number of offerees, and the ability of each offeree to assume
the risk of his investment. See Position Paper, supra note 12, at 499; see generally text
accompanying notes 31-33 supra. In addition, offerees must be provided with or have access
to the requisite information. See Position Paper, supra note 12, at 499; see generally text
accompanying notes 40-65 supra. The issuer's manner of conducting a securities offering also
is an important factor. See Position Paper, supra note 12, at 499; text accompanying note 30
supra. Finally, issuers should ascertain that offerees are purchasing securities for their private
investment purposes. Thus, proof of the absence of redistribution and the absence of a
redistributive intent is an important factor in establishing the availability of the private
placement exemption. In United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967), the Fourth Circuit noted that the non-distributive
intent could be evidenced by requiring offerees to sign an investment letter indicating that
they knew the securities were purchased in compliance with the requirements of § 4(2) and
that the securities were restricted. Id. at 679; see text accompanying notes 107-95 infra. In
addition, to further restrict the sale of restricted securities by a purchaser of the securities,
each stock certificate can be printed with a legend outlining the restricted nature of the
security. 376 F.2d at 679. These precautionary measures alone are not sufficient to support a
finding that the securities were sold in a non-public offering; however, taking these precau-
tions does indicate the issuer's attempt to comply with the requirements of § 4(2). Id.; see
SEC v. International Scanning Devices, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,147 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1977) (letters of non-distributive intent and restrictive
legends are "essential element" of private placement).
11 See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977). The
determination of the availability of § 4(2) focuses on an evaluation of the whole offering and
consideration of the various factors. See generally text accompanying notes 28-65 supra; note
73 supra. In Doran, the Fifth Circuit found that the number of offerees and their access to
information were the most critical factors, id. at 900, see text accompanying notes 31-39
supra, and the issuer's failure to prove that each offeree had access to the requisite informa-
tion was fatal to the issuer's claim of a § 4(2) exemption. 545 F.2d at 900.
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Rule 146" must be complied with stringently." While there are similarities
between the requirements of section 4(2) and Rule 146,11 certain provisions
of the Rule make satisfaction of the Rule's criteria more difficult than
satisfaction of the section 4(2) criteria. Under Rule 146, the number of
purchasers of a non-public offering is limited to thirty-five,6 while section
" Briefly, the requirements of Rule 146 are: (1) there must be no general solicitation or
advertising of the offering; (2) the issuer must have reasonable grounds to believe that each
offeree has the financial and business experience to evaluate the merits and risks of the
investment or that an offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment; (3) if
securities are sold to a person who can bear the economic risk but is lacking the requisite
investment experience, the offeree must be represented by an offeree representative who has
the requisite experience, see note 77 infra; (4) offerees must have access to or be provided
with the same kind of information that would be contained in a registration statement; (5)
there must be no more than 35 purchasers of an offering; and (6) the issuer must use reasona-
ble care to ascertain that purchasers are not acting as underwriters, see note 6 supra, to
redistribute the shares, see note 73 supra; text accompanying notes 107-95 infra (sale of
restricted securities). See Rule 146(c), (d)(1), (d)(2), (e), (g), (h).
, See Rule 146(b).
77 Both § 4(2) and Rule 146 require the issuer to conduct an offering in a non-public
manner. See text accompanying note 30 supra; note 75 supra (Rule 146(c)). Additionally, §
4(2) and Rule 146 require that offerees be sophisticated and have access to or be provided
with information that a registration statement would contain. See text accompanying notes
33, 40-65 supra; note 75 supra (Rule 146(d)(1), (d)(2), (e)).
Rule 146 is more flexible than § 4(2) in one aspect; Rule 146 recognizes the concept of
an offeree representative. An offeree representative can represent an unsophisticated investor
who is able to bear the economic risk of an investment. See Rule 146(d)(2). An offeree
representative must have the financial experience necessary to evaluate the merits and risks
of an investment, Rule 146(a)(1)(ii), and must not be an "affiliate, director, officer or other
employee of the issuer . . ." of the securities. Rule 146(a)(1)(i); see Pension and Investment
Assocs. of America, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 81,405
(SEC Staff Reply Oct. 4, 1977) (a dealer of securities, see note 7 supra, considering participa-
tion as a partner in the private sale of certain securities, asserted that the dealer's
"employees" were unsalaried and only received commissions on sales of securities; therefore,
the dealer argued that its "employees" were independent contractors, not within the group
proscribed by Rule 146(a)(1)(i), and that the "employees" could act as offeree representatives
in the proposed private sale; the SEC disagreed, disallowing PIAA's attempt to qualify its
employees as independent contractors and thereby precluding the employees from acting as
offeree representatives). In addition, an offeree must acknowledge in writing that he is being
represented by an offeree representative, Rule 146(a)(1)(iii), and the representative must
disclose to the offeree the existence of any material relationship between the representative
and the issuer. Rule 146(a)(1)(iii). Where a qualified offeree representative is involved in a
transaction, the issuer of securities must furnish the representative with the information
which a registration statement would disclose. In contrast, an offeree must be furnished with
the requisite information or have access to it. See Rule 146(e)(1)(i) & (ii); 1973-74 Securities
Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 730, 734 (1975); see also text accompanying notes
93-106 infra (proposed amendment to Rule 146(e) that would require less information to be
furnished where small private offerings are involved).
11 Rule 146(g)(1). For purposes of the 35 purchaser requirement and the other require-
ments of Rule 146 the definition of an offering is important. Rule 146(b)(1) provides that an
offering does not include offers or sales which take place prior to the six month period
preceding the offering in question or after the six month period following the offering. Offers
and sales which occur within the six month period may be considered part of the offering in
question. See Rule 146, Preliminary Note 3, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977). This aggregation of
separate offerings may cause the combined offering to run afoul of Rule 146 if one of the
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4(2) imposes no specific limit on the size of an offering as long as the
manner of conducting the offering is appropriate" and the number of offer-
ees and purchasers is not excessive. 0 The Rule also imposes mechanical
requirements on issuers necessitating documentation and record-keeping."
In addition, the SEC recently amended Rule 146 to require the filing of a
disclosure statement by issuers attempting to qualify an offering for ex-
emption under Rule 146.82 Prior to adopting Rule 146(i), the SEC lacked
empirical data regarding the use of Rule 146 by issuers and also lacked the
ability to perceive misuses of the Rule." In an effort to correct these short-
comings, Rule 146(i) requires an issuer, who, in reliance on Rule 146, is
offering more than $50,000 worth of securities in a year, to file a report with
the SEC at the time of the first sale in a particular offering." This report
must include basic information regarding the issuer, names and addresses
of people facilitating the issuance of the securities, a description of the
financial size of the offering, and an indication whether the issuer has
previously filed reports with the SEC pursuant to Rule 146(i).e In the
event of any material change in the facts accompanying an offering made
pursuant to Rule 146, the issuer must file an amended report with the
component offers or sales does not meet the standards of Rule 146. Such aggregation may
result in more than 35 purchasers being involved in a private offering, thereby violating the
35 purchaser requirement. Thus, in The Shockey Cos., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,924 (SEC Staff Reply Nov. 12, 1976), petitioner was concerned that
a yearly offering of company stock to not more than 35 employees would have to be aggre-
gated. The SEC held that such offerings did not have to be aggregated and were eligible for
exemption under the criteria of Rule 146.
Rule 146(g)(2)(i) excludes certain persons from the 35 purchaser limitation. Rule
146(g)(2)(i)(d) provides that investors who purchase $150,000 or more worth of securities for
cash in a single payment or installments do not have to be included in the 35 total. In Robert
S. Sinn Securities, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,905 (SEC
Staff Reply Nov. 4, 1976), investors were going to purchase interests in a non-public offering.
Certain investors were going to purchase $150,000 worth of securities by paying $75,000 cash
and by issuing a non-recourse promissory note for the balance. Petitioner sought to have these
investors excluded from the 35 total, but the SEC found that because a portion of the
consideration paid was in the form of a non-recourse note, the Rule 146(g)(2)(i)(d) exception
was inapplicable and the investors were includible in calculating the number of investors.
' See text accompanying note 30 supra. See also note 77 supra.
" See Position Paper, supra note 12, at 501.
1, Id. Rule 146(e)(3) requires the issuer to notify the offeree, in writing, of material
relationships between the issuer and any offeree representatives, see note 77 supra, and of
the restrictions on the sale of privately placed securities, see text accompanying notes 107-95
infra. The issuer also must place restrictive legends on the securities and obtain an agreement
from purchasers that the securities will not be resold in violation of the '33 Act. Rule 146(h)(2)
& (4); see note 73 supra (§ 4(2) precautionary measures).
" SEC Securities Act Release No. 5912, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,524 (March 3, 1978).
" Id. at 80,118.
Id. at 80,119. The original proposal of Rule 146(i) required issuers to file a report with
the SEC within 10 days after the termination of an offering and an annual report would have
to be filed for any offering extending for more than a year. Id.
" Id. at 80,120. Information concerning previous filings will enable the SEC to determine
the extent to which Rule 146 is used by particular issuers. Id.
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SEC." Rule 146(i), as adopted, is substantially less burdensome than the
originally proposed rule. 7 Nevertheless, this additional burden, in con-
junction with the previously mentioned limitations of Rule 146,M may force
issuers to rely on the section 4(2) exemption. Thus, issuers who seek to
avoid the expenses and burdens of registration 9 must suffer the burdens
of Rule 146 or the uncertainty of section 4(2)."
Critics of Rule 146 have indicated that both registration and Rule 146
are inappropriate for the small businessman." One proposed remedy has
been to include a "substantial compliance" clause in Rule 146 that would
foreclose a purchaser of unregistered securities who had received sufficient
information to make an informed investment decision from rescinding a
"sour deal" on the basis of the issuer's failure to comply with the technical
requirements of Rule 146.2 Inclusion of a substantial compliance clause
would create an intermediate ground between the uncertainty of relying
on section 4(2) and the burdens imposed by absolute compliance with Rule
146. Thus, small businessmen would be able to avoid some of the burdens
of Rule 146 and structure a non-public offering that would be protected
from the opportunistic rescission claims of disillusioned investors.
The SEC also has proposed an amendment to Rule 146(e), which con-
cerns the type of information that issuers must provide to offerees. Pres-
ently, Rule 146(e) provides that each offeree must have access to the kind
of information that a registration statement would reveal about an issuer.
9 3
Alternatively, each offeree or his offeree representative9" must be furnished
with the requisite information by the issuer. The information which must
be disclosed under this alternative varies depending on the character of the
issuer. If an issuer engages in public securities transactions and thereby is
subject to the registration and reporting requirements of the '33 and '34
Acts, the issuer must disclose to offerees the information contained in a
registration statement98 and any information contained in a "definitive"
proxy statement 7 or periodic report8 which was filed with the SEC subse-
" Id. at 80,119-20.
9 Id. at 80,119.
u7 See text accompanying notes 78 & 81 supra. See also note 75 supra.
'7 See note 1 supra.
'7 See Casey, supra note 69, at 591.
" Id. at 592.
'2 Id. at 594. The present strictness of Rule 146 allows an investor to take advantage of a
technical failure to comply with all of Rule 146's requirements. The investor may be able to
void the non-public status of an offering and escape the economic consequences of a "sour
deal" despite the fact that the investor willfully entered into the original agreement to pur-
chase the securities. Id. at 592.
13 See Rule 146(e)(1)(i); note 1 supra.
' See note 77 supra.
'7 Rule 146(e)(1)(ii).
" See note 1 supra.
'7 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976); Section V, Proxy
Solicitation infra.
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976) requires issuers of
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quent to filing the registration statement.9 In addition, a "reporting" is-
suer must supply offerees with a description of the securities which are
being offered in reliance on Rule 146, the use to be made of the proceeds
of the non-public offering, and any material changes regarding the issuer
which are not disclosed in the documents filed with the SEC. 00 If, on the
other hand, an issuer is not a "reporting" issuer, then such issuer must only
provide offerees with the information that would be included on a registra-
tion statement.'0 '
Proposed Rule 146(e)(1)(ii)(d) decreases the burden imposed by the
extensive disclosure requirements noted above. Under the proposed Rule,
issuers engaged in a non-public offering, the value of which does not exceed
$500,000, need to disclose only the information required by Schedule I of
Regulation A.'10 While the information required by Schedule I is similar
to information that must be included in a registration statement,'0 3 docu-
ments prepared in compliance with Schedule I generally are briefer and
less detailed than registration statements.' 4 Furthermore, Schedule I does
not require the issuer to prepare the extensive financial documents which
accompany a registration statement. Under Schedule I, the issuer must
provide offerees with documents disclosing the financial status of the issuer
for the two years preceding the offering.0 5 Because compliance with the
requirements of Schedule I is less time consuming and less expensive,
small businessmen would benefit from the enactment of the proposed
Rule. Furthermore, the SEC has indicated that enactment of Rule
146(e)(1)(ii)(d) should encourage more issuers to take advantage of Rule
146 without compromising the protection afforded investors by effective
disclosure of relevant information. 0 6
B. Rule 144
Securities sold pursuant to a private offering'07 are restricted securi-
ties' 0 which can only be resold by an investor in compliance with Rule 144
or section 4(1) of the '33 Act. Prior to the adoption of Rule 144,' °0 the resale
securities to file periodic reports with the SEC to supplement information in a registration
statement.
Rule 146(e)(1)(ii)(a)(1).
' Rule 146(e)(1)(ii)(a)(2); see text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
"' Rule 146(e)(1)(ii)(b).
See Proposed Rule 146(e)(1)(ii)(d); 43 FED. REG. 10704 (1978); 17 C.F.R. § 239.90
(1977).
"1 See note 1 supra.
"I See Burge, Regulation A: A Review and a Look at Recent Developments, 46 L.A. BAR
BULL., 290-94, 308-20 (1971).
' Id.; cf. note 1 supra (more extensive financial disclosure required under Schedule A).
"' See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5913, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,532 at 80,173 (March 6, 1978).
,a See text accompanying notes 9-106 supra.
,0 Rule 144(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1977).
"' 17 C.F.R. § 203.144 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rule 144]. See Securities Act Release
No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.*(CCH) 78,487 (Jan. 11, 1972).
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generally was accomplished by reliance on section 4(1) of the '33 Act."10
Section 4(1) exempts public sales "by any person other than an issuer,'"
underwriter,"'2 or dealer""' from the registration requirements of section
5.'I4 Originally, the availability of the section 4(1) exemption for the sale
of restricted securities depended on an investor's intent regarding the re-
sale of restricted securities at the time they were purchased,"' the length
of time that the investor held the securities, and the impact of any unfor-
seeable changes in circumstances."' Consideration of these factors was
necessary to determine whether a purchaser of restricted securities had
assumed the economic risk of holding unregistered securities or whether
the investor merely was acting as a conduit for the sale of such securities."7
Rule 144 codified this analysis, attempting to establish a standard for
the resale of restricted securities. Although Rule 146 is non-exclusive,""8 the
SEC did not indicate that Rule 144 is non-exclusive. Therefore, an investor
seeking to resell restricted securities must comply with all of the require-
ments of Rule 144."'' The alternative to compliance with Rule 144 is regis-
tration of the securities'2 1 prior to resale or imposition of liability on the
investor for the sale of unregistered securities.'"' Generally, Rule 144 re-
quires an investor to hold unregistered securities for a period of two years
in order to qualify those securities for resale.'1 A resale of securities must
be executed through a "brokers' transaction."'2 In addition, the investor/
seller must have a bona fide intent to sell, 12 current information con-
cerning the issuer must be available,'1 the investor/seller must provide
notice of the proposed sale to the SEC,' 8 and the resale must comply with
,,0 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1976).
See note 5 supra.
"2 See note 6 supra.
,,3 See note 7 supra.
,, See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
", See note 73 supra (importance of non-distributive intent).
,, See Linden, The Resale of Restricted and Control Securities Under SEC Rule 144:
The First Five Years, 8 SEroN HALL L. REv. 157, 162-63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Linden].
", See Rule 144, Preliminary Note, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1977).
"1 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
11 Rule 144 has been interpreted as allowing the sale of restricted securities under § 4(1)
by satisfaction of the requirements which administrative and judicial decisions have incorpo-
rated into § 4(1). See Linden, supra note 116, at 240-41. Nevertheless, exclusivity may be a
moot issue since the administrative and judicial guidelines closely resemble Rule 144. Id. at
241.
' See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
,5, See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1976). Although an issuer of
restricted securities may escape liability for the sale of unregistered securities by qualifying
for an exemption, see text accompanying notes 9-106 supra and text accompanying notes 196-
211 infra, the purchaser of the unregistered securities may subject himself to liability by
reselling the securities in violation of § 4(1) or Rule 144.
'" Rule 144(d); see text accompanying notes 152-79 infra.
123 Rule 144(f) & (g); see text accompanying notes 128-51 infra.
"I, Rule 144(i). See generally text accompanying notes 186-91 infra.
12 Rule 144(c); Linden, supra note 116, at 191.
126 Rule 144(h). See generally text accompanying notes 185-91 infra.
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the volume limitations imposed by Rule 144.'2
Specifically, Rule 144(f) requires that restricted securities be resold in
a brokers' transaction. "8 Rule 144(g) defines brokers' transaction as a
transaction in which a broker'2 does not solicit customers' orders to buy
the restricted securities'30 and does no more than execute the sales order
as an agent for the investor selling those securities. 3 In addition, the
broker must make a reasonable inquiry to ascertain whether the investor
seeking to resell the securities is" acting as an underwriter.3 2 Finally, the
broker must not receive more than his usual and customary broker's com-
mission for executing the sale of the restricted securities.
3
The impact of Rule 144(f) and (g) is apparent in SEC v. E. L. Aaron &
Co."' Aaron & Co. (the company) was a broker-dealer'3 which conducted
securities transactions for the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp.
(LAM). 3 ' Two directors of LAM owned a portion of LAM's unregistered
securities. Desiring to purchase some of these securities on its own account,
the company approached the two directors of LAM concerning the sale of
the securities held by the directors. "7 The directors did not know that the
company was purchasing the securities for its own account.'38 The com-
pany attempted to structure the sale of the unregistered securities in com-
pliance with Rule 144. In so doing, the company arranged for another
broker-dealer to act as an intermediary for the sale of the securities. At the
company's direction, the securities were sold by the directors to the inter-
mediary, and the shares were then sold by the intermediary to the com-
pany."' 9 At the same time that these transactions were occurring, the com-
pany was involved in selling LAM's registered securities.'40 In connection
with these sales some of the company's representatives made false and
misleading statements concerning the registered securities.', The actions
"1 Rule 144(e); see text accompanying notes 180-91 infra.
'I Rule 144(f).
I's A broker is a person who buys and sells securities for the account of others. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1976).
I' Rule 144(g)(2); see note 133 infra.
'n Rule 144(g)(1).
'3 Rule 144(g)(3); see note 6 supra (defining underwriter).
13 Rule 144(g)(1). Section 4(1) and Rule 144 are designed to exempt routine trading
transactions from the requirements of registration. See Rule 144, Preliminary Note, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (1977). Since solicitation of customers' orders and payment of additional compensa-
tion to brokers are characteristic of a distribution of securities rather than routine trading
transactions, sbch activities preclude exemption under Rule 144. Id.
'll [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
1977).
' A broker-dealer operates as both a broker and a dealer. See notes 7 & 129 supra.
'3 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,681-82.
' Id. at 91,683.
'3 Id.
I Id. at 91,683-84.
"' Id. at 91,682.
"' Id. at 91,682-83. The company's representatives told prospective purchasers that the
company was undertaking the manufacture of a new type of small car and a tractor. In fact,
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of these representatives prompted the SEC to bring suit against the com-
pany alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the '33 and '34
Acts,4 2 and the SEC also alleged that the company's purchase of the unre-
gistered securities was in violation of section 5 of the '33 Act."3 Section 5(c)
prohibits the use of the mails or interstate commerce to offer to sell or buy
an unregistered security.' Regarding the purchase of the unregistered
securities, the company argued that the requirements of Rule 144 were
complied with and therefore the transaction was exempt from the prohibi-
tions of section 5(c).'
45
The court found that the unregistered securities were not sold in a
brokers' transaction and that the Rule 144 exemption was not available to
the company.' 46 The company did not act merely as the agent for the seller
of the securities,'47 but purchased the securities for its own account. Fur-
thermore, the company was soliciting customers' orders to purchase the
unregistered securities after the company had purchased the securities
from LAM's directors. The court held that such solicitation violates Rule
144(g)(2) and prevents the company's actions from qualifying as a brokers'
transaction. 4 The company also could not comply with Rule 144 by pur-
chasing the securities from an intermediary broker-dealer. If the broker-
dealer had acted as a selling agent for the LAM directors, the company
could have purchased the securities and the sale would have complied with
Rule 144.'11 However, because the company arranged the entire transac-
tion, the court characterized the participation of the intermediary broker-
dealer as a sham."10 Therefore, the company's actions violated the registra-
tion requirement of section 5.'
Rule 144 also requires that restricted securities must be held for a
period of two years prior to resale"2 and the Rule imposes volume limita-
tions on the amount of securities which may be resold at any one time."1
3
the company had no such plan. In addition, the company's representatives made false state-
ments concerning the financial condition of the company.
12 Id. at 91,680. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1977).
143 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,681.
"1 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976).
'15 The company asserted that the sale of the securities by LAM's directors complied with
Rule 144. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,685. Although as a
purchaser the company can make that assertion, the company's actions as broker for the
transaction foreclose the availability of the Rule 144 exemption. See text accompanying notes
146-51 infra. See also text accompanying note 120 supra (alternative to exemption is registra-
tion).
," [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,685-86.
,47 Rule 144(g)(1); see text accompanying note 131 supra.
'+' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,685.
,, See id. at 91,685-86.
150 Id.





The effect of these requirements on the operation of an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP)'54 was examined in Lanchart Industries, Inc.'55
Lanchart established an ESOP wherein all qualified employees automati-
cally participated.'56 The company contributed securities and cash to the
plan in amounts determined by the Board of Directors, and participants
were not allowed to make contributions to the plan.'57 The plan provided
that contributed stock was to be held in the name of the trustee of the plan
and all acquisitions of stock for the plan were to be made in compliance
with section 4(2),'11 thus making registration of the stock unnecessary.' 9
The trustee would allocate shares according to a fixed formula and keep
records of each participant's beneficial ownership in the fund.'60 The plan
provided that thirty percent of accrued benefits would vest after three
years of service, and that the percentage of benefits vesting would increase
until fully vested after ten years of service. 6 ' Interest in the plan also would
become fully vested and distributable upon death, retirement or perma-
nent disability of an employee.'62 Upon distribution of a participant's share
he was given the option of requiring the company to repurchase the stock.' 3
The company presented these facts to the SEC and requested the SEC to
indicate what rights participants had to resell the stocks in compliance
with Rule 144.166
Rule 144(d)(1) requires that restricted securities be held by an investor
for a period of two years before those securities can be resold.' 5 In response
to the company's request in Lanchart, the SEC indicated that the holding
period would begin to run, from a participant's standpoint, when the par-
ticipant's interest in the plan was fully vested and not subject to forfeiture.
,"I An ESOP is essentially a deferred employee benefit. The employer normally makes
contributions of "employer securities" (e.g. the common stock of the company) to individual
employee accounts. The employee receives the stock as a benefit while the employer is
allowed a tax deduction under I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A). See Canan, Employee Stock Ownership
Plans, 61 A.B.A.J. 880, 880 (1975); see generally Givner, ESOPS and the Federal Securities
Laws, 31 Bus. LAw. 1889 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Givner].
'1' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,173 (SEC Staff Reply
March 2, 1977).
W To qualify for participation in the ESOP, an employee must have at least one year of
experience with the company or must be at least 25 years of age. Id. at 88,022.
157 Id.
,s See text accompanying notes 9-106 supra.
' ' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 88,022-23.
'1 Id. at 88,023.
"' Id.
"2 Id. Although a participant's share became fully vested after ten years of service, his
share was not distributable until the termination of employment. Id.
10 Id. The repurchase option given to employees under the plan had no expiration date.
Id. at 88,020.
'" Parties undertaking a securities transaction may request the SEC to provide interpre-
tive legal advice with respect to the effect of a statute, rule, or regulation upon the transac-
tion. In essence, a "no action" letter requests the SEC to indicate whether, given a particular
set of facts, the transaction involved would violate a statute, rule, or regulation and cause
the SEC to take enforcement action. 17 C.F.R. § 200.81 (1977).
"I Rule 144(d)(1).
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That the trustee still held the shares did not affect the commencement or
running of the holding period.'68 Since an employee's share in the plan
vested gradually over a period of ten years the running of the holding
period was staggered. After three years of employment an employee had a
thirty percent vested share in the plan and such share would increase ten
percent for each additional year worked until an employee's share was one
hundred percent vested after ten years of service.6 7 Each year the holding
period would begin running for that additional ten percent interest in the
plan that had vested during that year.'68 The staggered running of the
holding is important because of the impact that the repurchase option'69
has on the holding period.
Under Rule 144(d) (3), the period during which an investor can exercise
a repurchase option must be excluded from the holding period.Y0 Because
the repurchase option in Lanchart became exercisable upon distribution
of an employee's share'7' and had no specific time of expiration,'7 2 the
entire period after distribution must be excluded from calculation of the
holding period. Thus, if at the time of distribution the holding period had
not run for any portion of an employee's vested share, then the employee
would be prevented from ever selling that portion of his share in compli-
ance with Rule 144.'
73
61 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 88,019; accord, Crowley
Maritime Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,443 (SEC Staff
Reply Jan. 27, 1976); see Rule 144(d)(1) (employee is beneficial owner of vested share). See
generally Givner, supra note 154, at 1892-96.
" [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 88,023.
118 Id. at 88,026. But cf. Roto Am. Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 78,026 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 19, 1971). Roto concerned the pre-Rule 144 doctrine
of fungibility. Stock of a single class was considered fungible. Thus, where an investor ac-
quired securities periodically, each acquisition required the holding period to start anew for
all stock of the same class as that acquired. The doctrine of fungibility has since been rejected
by the SEC. See, e.g., NLT Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
79,710 (SEC Staff Reply Jan. 11, 1974).
16 See text accompanying note 163 supra.
,70 Rule 144(d)(3) requires exclusion from the running of the holding period of any period
during which a purchaser of securities has a short position, put, or option to "dispose of any
equity securities of the same class or any securities convertible into securities of such class
. . ." See, e.g., Familian Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I
80,614 (SEC Staff Reply Apr. 1, 1976) (option to resell at guaranteed price must be excluded
from holding period); Telerent Leasing Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,445 (SEC Staff Reply Jan. 28, 1976) (12 month repurchase option under ESOP
must be excluded from running of holding period); Crowley Maritime Corp., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,443 (SEC Staff Reply Jan. 27, 1976) (12
month repurchase option under ESOP must be excluded).
7I See text accompanying note 162 supra.
1'2 See note 163 supra.
'1 Assume that an employee completes six years of service before becoming permanently
disabled. Although his share becomes fully vested at that time, the holding period would only
have run for a 40% vested share. Because the repurchase option has no termination date the
period after distribution must be excluded from the holding period. Therefore, the two year
holding period will never run for 60% of the employee's vested share. Thus, the employee only
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Compliance with the two year holding requirement is aided by the
concept of "tacking." In certain transfers of restricted securities the trans-
feree is able to treat the holding period for such securities as beginning at
the time the holding period began to run for'the transferor.74 In situations
involving a gift of restricted securities, the donee can treat his holding
period as having started when the donor's began.17 Additionally, "tacking"
of holding periods is allowed where a group of securities is converted, for
example, in an exchange of preferred stock for common stock."' In
Lanchart, a question arose concerning calculation of the holding period for
a beneficiary of an employee's share.1 7 The SEC indicated that if the
beneficiary acquired the employee's interest as a gift the beneficiary would
be able to tack the employee's holding period. 78 If, however, the benefici-
ary acquired the employee's share for consideration, the beneficiary could
treat the holding period as beginning when he had acquired a nonforfeita-
ble interest in securities vested in an employee's account.",
Rule 144 also imposes limitations on the volume of securities which can
be resold pursuant to the Rule's requirements. If registered securities' are
traded on a national exchange, then the amount of restricted securities
that can be sold by an investor during a six month period is "the lesser of
. . . one percent of the shares. . . outstanding""' "as shown by the most
recent report or statement published by the issuer, or . . . the average
weekly reported volume of trading in [registered] securities on all securi-
ties exchanges . . . during the four calendar weeks preceding the filing of
. . ." the notice which must be filed with the SEC."2 If registered securi-
ties"' are not traded on a national exchange, the amount of restricted
can resell 40% of his acquired stock in compliance with Rule 144. The remaining 60% can be
resold only if the shares are registered.
:' Rule 144(d)(4).
' Rule 144(d)(4)(v). See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,554 (SEC Staff Reply Apr. 16, 1976).
"I' Rule 144(d)(4)(ii). See, e.g., Tymshare, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 80,569 (SEC Staff Reply Apr. 28, 1976); Kasper Initruments, Inc., [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,431 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 26, 1976).
Where conversion of stock is involved, the holding period may be tacked if the old stock is
the only consideration given in exchange for the converted stock. National Am. Corp., [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,446 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 11, 1976).
But cf. Energy and Environmental Cos., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,906 (SEC Staff Reply Nov. 15, 1976) (individuals acquired stock upon dissolution
of corporation; SEC applied rule that individuals cannot tack onto corporation's holding
period for purpose of Rule 144).
"' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SaC. L. REP. (CCH) at 88,019.
, Id. at 88,019-20.
179 Id.
1' Although Rule 144 deals with the sale of unregistered securities, the Rule recognizes
that a company may trade registered securities on an exchange as well as issue unregistered
securities in compliance with § 4(2).
"I The number of outstanding shares includes both the registered and unregistered
shares.
"z Rule 144(e)(1)(i) & (2). See text accompanying note 185 infra (notice requirement).
' See note 180 supra.
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securities which can be sold by an investor during a six month period is
limited to one percent of the outstanding shares.' 4
Calculation of the volume limitation can affect not only the quantity
of restricted securities sold, but also the manner in which those securities
are sold. Rule 144(h) requires an investor to file a notice with the SEC
indicating that the investor plans to sell restricted securities in reliance on
Rule 144.1's In addition, Rule 144(i) provides that an investor filing notice
under Rule 144(h) must have a bona fide intent to sell the restricted securi-
ties within a reasonable time after the notice is filed.' 8 The interaction
between these sections and calculation of the volume limitation is appar-
ent in Flight Safety International, Inc.' 7 Petitioner owned restricted stock
which could not be resold until June 6, 1976. The issuer of the restricted
stock also traded registered stock on national exchanges, but the trading
volume of that stock was small and the "lesser of' requirement of Rule
144(e) would have prevented petitioner from selling large amounts of his
restricted stock.' 8 On March 2, 1976 an extraordinarily large volume of the
issuer's registered stock was traded on exchanges. If this large sales volume
could be included in calculating the average weekly volume, the "lesser of"
rule would permit petitioner to use the volume limitation of one percent
of the outstanding shares.'8 ' Since the one percent limit was significantly
larger than the normal weekly trading volume, the petitioner could sell a
larger amount of his restricted stock. Therefore, on April 1 the petitioner
filed notice with the SEC of his intent to sell restricted securities." ' This
notice was filed even though the securities could not be sold until June 6.
"' Rule 144(e)(1)(ii) & (2). The impact which the volume limitation has on the number
of securities which an investor can sell in compliance with Rule 144 is supplemented by the
Rule 144(e)(3) requirement that certain transactions must be aggregated in determining
whether the volume restrictions have been violated. For example, Rule 144(e) (3) (iii) provides
that "[tihe amount of securities sold for the account of a donee thereof during any period of
6 months within 2 years after the donation, and the amount of securities sold during the same
6 month period for the account of the donor, shall not exceed, in the aggregate," the applica-
ble volume limitation as calculated by Rule 144(e)(1)(i) & (ii). See Lanchart Indus., Inc.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) at 88,020 (in the absence of concerted
action between participants and company to disrupt market for company's securities, no
aggregation of sales by participants and company required).
I" Rule 144(h) requires that notice of a sale made in compliance with Rule 144 be filed
with the SEC unless "the amount of securities to be sold during any period of six months
does not exceed 500 shares. . . and the aggregate sale price thereof does not exceed $10,000."
"' Rule 144(i).
is? [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 80,563 (SEC Staff Reply Apr.
30, 1976).
"I See text accompanying notes 180-82 supra.
"31 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 86,453; see text accompany-
ing notes 180-82 supra.
110 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 86,453; see Rule 144(h). The
petitioner waited as long as possible before filing his notice with the SEC. By waiting until
April 1 to file his notice the petitioner still was able to take advantage of the high trading
day of March 2 since the four weeks preceding April 1 were March 1-5, 8-12, 15-19, and 22-
26. If petitioner had not filed until April 5, the week of March 1-5 would no longer be included
in the four weeks preceding the notice required by Rule 144(e)(1)(i).
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The SEC disallowed petitioner's attempt to include the March 2 trading
volume in his calculations. The SEC stressed that the sixty-five day lapse
between the filing of the notice and the time the shares were eligible for
sale was not within the scope of reasonable time allowed by Rule 144(i). 11
A major problem with Rule 144 is that investors must hold restricted
securities for two years before the securities can be resold. Because this
holding period ties up an investor's capital, investors may confine their
investments to registered securities or the restricted securities of estab-
lished companies where little risk is involved in holding an asset for two
years. "' Small companies may be forced to register their issues since inves-
tors" will be unwilling to assume the risk of holding the restricted securities
of these "unsecure" companies. Yet, the cost of registering securities is
particularly burdensome on these smaller companies." 3 It has been sug-
gested that the private offering 9' only can become a viable alternative to
registration by amending Rule 144 to provide for a larger volume of sales
after an investor has assumed the risk of an investment by meeting the
holding requirement."5
C. Rule 147
Rule 147'"1 parallels section 3(a)(11) of the '33 Act which exempts in-
trastate offerings from registration. "7 The rule principally requires that the
issuer be doing business within the state"9' and that the offering be
"genuinely local in character.""' To be doing business, an issuer must
derive at least eighty percent of its gross revenues "from the operation of
a business or of real property located in or from the rendering of services
within such state. . .,"20 have at least eighty percent of its assets located
within the state,29' intend to use and use at least eighty percent of the
proceeds of the intrastate offering within the state,02 and have its princi-
"1 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 86,453; see text accompany-
ing note 186 supra.
192 See Casey, supra note 69, at 595.
'" Id. at 575.
" See text accompanying notes 9-106 supra.
" See Casey, supra note 69, at 597-98.
'" 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rule 147]. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-5450, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2340 (Jan. 7, 1974).
' Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a)(11) (1976).
29 Rule 147(c).
" The SEC notes that an issue which is genuinely local in character is one "which in
reality represents local financing by local industries, carried out through local investment."
Rule 147 Preliminary Note 3, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1977).
"I Rule 147(c)(2)(i). The 80% requirement is calculated fdr the principal industry and
all subsidiaries. Id. Thus, a company with stores in numerous states may not be able to
qualify for the Rule 147 exemption. Even if a company does qualify under this subsection it
may fail to meet the other criteria necessary to be considered doing business in a state. See
text accompanying notes 201-02 infra.
"I Rule 147(c)(2)(ii). The calculation of the share of a company's assets within the state
must take all subsidiaries into consideration.
I Rule 147(c)(2)(iii). The proceeds must be used "in connection with the operation of a
1978]
798 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
pal office within such state."0 3 These criteria are interpreted rigorously.
In Berkeley and Co.,'0 4 the company had assets located in Iowa, Can-
ada, and Taiwan. Seventy-nine point eight percent of its assets were lo-
cated in Iowa. The SEC refused to allow the use of Rule 147 because the
eighty percent requirement had not been met. The SEC also refused to
allow the company to use a fair market valuation of its assets where such
accounting method would bring the share of assets in Iowa to eighty-three
point five percent.
In conjunction with the eighty percent requirement, offerings must also
be local in character." 5 In Western Credit Association, Inc., 2 petitioner
proposed the sale of short term notes to California residents. Those notes
could be placed with a California bank as a contribution toward the pur-
chase of an annuity from a Maryland insurance company which did over
fifty percent of its business in California. In denying the offering exempt
status under Rule 147, the SEC noted that the participation of the Mary-
land insurance company foreclosed the offering from being genuinely local
in character."7
Although Rule 147 expressly states that it is non-exclusive,20 ' critics
suggest that judges and the SEC will look to Rule 147 as providing the
guidelines for determining whether an offering is intrastate within the
meaning of section 3(a) (11) . 29 These guidelines can "be expected to 'spill
over'. . . until they have preempted the field." '' Thus, issuers who cannot
fulfill the requirements of Rule 147 "should not look to the intrastate
offering exemption as a method of raising capital in the future." ''
Conclusion
Although Rules 144, 146 and 147 were enacted to establish standards
for determining the availability of various exemptions under the '33 Act,
the requirements of each Rule must be strictly complied with. Recently,
the SEC has expressed concern that the stringent requirements of the
Rules are preventing issuers and investors from taking advantage of the
Rules. Therefore, the SEC has proposed an amendment to Rule 146 which
business or of real property, the purchase of real property located in, or the rendering of
services within such state.
Rule 147(c)(2)(iv).
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 80,356 (SEC Staff Reply
Sept. 16, 1975).
20 See note 199 supra.
2m [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 80,439 (SEC Staff Reply Feb.
26, 1976).
207 Id. at 86,159.
I0 Rule 147 Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1977).
219 See Alberg & Lybecker, New S.E.C. Rules 146 and 147: The Non-Public and Intra-
state Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLuM. L. Rav. 622,
653 (1974).
211 Id. at 653.
211 Id.
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